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Key-Value Store Using a Network Packet Filter Situated in the OS Kernel  
ABSTRACT 
 When thousands of machines coordinate a small piece of information, a network key-
value store can struggle to keep up with the query load. An underlying cause of the capacity 
bottleneck is that the key-value store is usually held in user space, not kernel space. This 
disclosure leverages the run-in-kernel capabilities of a network packet filter to deliver very fast 
responses to key-value (hash map) requests. The network packet filter is capable of 
communicating with hash-map type memory accesses and can rewrite and redirect packets. 
When assembled this way, a packet with the query key can be returned to the requester with the 
value, with the entire request-response operation taking place in kernel space. 
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BACKGROUND 
 
Fig. 1: (a) A distributed computation served by a single node; (b) The single node becomes 
a bottleneck 
 Fig. 1(a) illustrates a distributed computation in which compute nodes {a, b, c} access a 
dynamic state stored in a key-value node P. For example, the dynamic state can be a version of a 
dataset that any of the compute nodes can update. In the simplest design, the key-value node 
serves, upon request, the latest value of the (potentially fast-changing) state to a compute node. 
The key-value node has a maximum capacity n−1. If the number of compute nodes accessing 
the key-value node reaches n or greater, as illustrated Fig. 1(b), then the key-value node may no 
longer be available (in the sense of the consistency-availability-partition-tolerance (CAP) 
theorem). 
While other topologies explore CAP trade-offs, the physical limit of per-machine loading 
capacity affects all consistent options. When thousands of machines coordinate a small piece of 
information, a network key-value store can struggle to keep up with the query load. As explained 
below, an underlying cause of the capacity bottleneck is that the key-value store is usually held 
in user space, not kernel space. 
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Fig. 2: A user-space key-value store takes substantial time to respond 
 Fig. 2 illustrates a network key-value database (also known as a request-response server) 
that operates in user space (as opposed to kernel space). Handling an incoming packet in kernel 
memory requires many time-consuming steps, e.g., copying the data into user memory (which in 
turn involves memory allocation and deallocation); switching context; passing to a user-space 
handler; etc., before it reaches the key-value store (also known as hash map). On the return 
journey from the key-value store, the response requires an equivalent number of steps. It is the 
presence of the many processing steps that results in slow responses, which in turn limits the 
availability of the key-value node.  
 Distributed computation tasks such as MapReduce cycles run across tens of thousands of 
machines, sometimes over multiple days of runtime. If some knowledge is found that must 
integrate into all ongoing processing tasks, communication across all these nodes can be 
difficult. 
 A network packet filter, such as the enhanced BPF (eBPF), has a programming facility 
that provides checked code that can run in-kernel on raw packet data that comes in through an 
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open port. Such a network packet filter is capable of communicating with hash-map type 
memory accesses and can rewrite and redirect packets. 
DESCRIPTION 
 This disclosure leverages the run-in-kernel capabilities of a network packet filter to 
deliver very fast responses to hash map requests. The network packet filter is capable of 
communicating with hash-map type memory accesses and can rewrite and redirect packets. 
When assembled this way, a packet with the query “key” can be returned to the requester with 
the value, with the entire request-response operation taking place in kernel space. 
 
Fig. 3: A kernel-space key-value store that leverages a network packet filter 
 Fig. 3 illustrates a kernel space network key-value store that leverages a network packet 
filter. A packet in kernel memory is processed by a filter handler, e.g., an eBPF handler, and the 
key carried by the packet is returned by the kernel hash map. Effectively, the key-value database 
is based on an eBPF packet handler, which acts as a request-response engine.  
The entire request-response operation occurs within the kernel, such that the overhead of 
kernel space to user space transformation (and back) is avoided. There are no context switches, 
memory allocations or deallocations that consume time. The eBPF prover ensures code safety, 
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making it safer than a kernel C module doing the same work. In the case of identical key and 
value sizes, the per-request memory usage is limited to the processing stack and the memory 
allocated to the one incoming packet.  
 For trusted environments like logs clusters, encryption and authentication can be added. 
In such environments, exceptional situations can arise, e.g., a problematic piece of analysis. 
While a problematic analysis may remain unrecovered within a pipeline run, thousands of other 
analyses are in jeopardy of being subject to code failure. The high cost of reruns can be 
mitigated, using the described techniques, by using an urgent coordination of a denylist to enable 
work to proceed. Examples of other applications include authentication cookie lookup, user-state 
coordination for the purposes of moving a user between loaded backends, and in general, any 
application where a single piece of rapidly changing information needs to be made available 
across many servers. 
  In this manner, the described techniques achieve a very fast request-response turnaround 
for key-value processing in a BPF-capable kernel, e.g., Linux, with memory safe code. The 
described BPF-based key-value database increases the availability of the same hardware 
(presuming an unsaturated network) to handle more nodes while using less processor and 
memory resources.  
CONCLUSION 
 This disclosure leverages the run-in-kernel capabilities of a network packet filter to 
deliver very fast responses to key-value (hash map) requests. The network packet filter is capable 
of communicating with hash-map type memory accesses and can rewrite and redirect packets. 
When assembled this way, a packet with the query key can be returned to the requester with the 
value, with the entire request-response operation taking place in kernel space. 
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